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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal is within the jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(f), since it involves an appeal from a court of record in a criminal case not
involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Whether the Court, at a hearing on an order to show cause for alleged violations of probation,
erred in revoking Appellant's probation and lifting the stay on the previously imposed sentence of
0-5 years in the Utah State Prison, in absentia - without the presence of the Appellant/Defendant
at the hearing.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Questions of law are reviewed for correctness, and the trial court's factual findings are
reversed only if clearly erroneous. State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995), State v.
Wanosik, 79 P.3d 937, 941 (Utah 2003).

PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE
In the hearing, Defense counsel objected to the hearing proceeding in absentia (without
presence of defendant). See Record at 91-92.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Rule 22 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, in pertinent part:

1

On the same grounds that a defendant maybe tried in defendant's absence, defendant
may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence. If a defendant fails to appear for
sentence, a warrant for defendant's arrest may be issued by the court.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Defendant was convicted of Criminal Nonsupport, a third degree felony, on or about

Octobe 8, 2004, and was placed on probation with the requirement that he comply with 36 months
supervised probation, pay back child support and pay ongoing child support with regular monthly
payments. See Record at 52-55. A prison sentence of 0-5 years was imposed but stayed. Id.
2.

An Order to Show Cause was filed on or about March 9, 2005, alleging Defendant

violated his probation by absconding in avoiding contact with AP&P; (2) failing to complete and
provide proof of evaluation and/or treatment; (3) failing to enter into, participate in or complete a
program, counseling or treatment as directed; (4) failing to pay supervision fees; and (5) failing to
report to Adult Probation and Parole as directed. R. at 59-62.
3.

Defendant was not accused of failing to pay his child support as ordered (which he

faithfully had been doing under probation). See id.
4.

That first Order to Show Cause was resolved with Defendant having been found in

violation of his probation as alleged {not including any allegation or finding that he had failed to pay
child support), and his probation was revoked and restarted, with specific orders that he, inter alia,
obtain the mental health evaluation and any recommended treatment as required, and that he report
in person to his AP&P supervising officer on June 1, July 1, Aug. 1, Sep. 1, and Oct. 3,2005. R. at
71-73.
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5.

A Second Order to Show Cause was filed on or about August 22,2005 alleging that

Defendant violated his probation by (1) failing to complete and provide proof of evaluation and/or
treatment; (2) failing to enter into, participate in or complete a program, counseling or treatment as
directed; (3) failing to pay supervision fees; and (4) failing to report to Adult Probation and Parole
as directed. R. at 77-82.
6.

Again, as with the first Order to Show Cause, Defendant was not accused of failing

to pay his child support as ordered (which he faithfully had been doing under probation). See id.
7.

A telephonic hearing was held on August 29 on the second Order to Show Cause

(hereafter referred to simply as the "Order to Show Cause"). Defendant was not present but the
AP&P officer informed the Court that Mr. Jones had called him that morning; while the AP&P
officer claimed that Defendant had told him to "make up a reason" for him not being there, Defense
counsel, however, argued on behalf of Defendant and indicated that she had only been made aware
the previous Friday late afternoon, of the Monday hearing, and had not been able to meet with her
client and advise him. A bench warrant was issued. R. at 83-86.
8.

In an effort to assist the matter to be resolved without arrest, Defense counsel

requested a hearing for a voluntary appearance on the bench warrant, and a hearing was set for
September 19, 2005. R. at 87-90.
9.

On September 19, 2005, the hearing was held; Defendant was not present. R. at 91 -

92. Defense counsel indicated that she had spoken with the Defendant and that he had committed
to be there - there was no indication of why he was not present, whether he had a valid excuse or
some legitimate problem which had arisen precluding his presence, etc., and therefore defense
counsel on behalf of the Defendant objected to the hearing proceeding, but the Court proceeded with
3

the evidentiary hearing and imposition of the 0-5 prison sentence which had previously been stayed.
R. at 91-92.
10.

The Court did not engage in a careful and complete evaluation of the reasons for the

Defendant's absence, nor did he instruct anyone to do so; instead the Court simply stated at the
beginning of the hearing:
What's the state's choice? What do you want to do? Do you want to
proceed without him? .. . If you want to proceed without him, we'll
proceed without him. I'll conclude he's voluntarily absented himself
from the hearing.
Transcript of Sep. 19, 2005 hearing, at p. 4-5, copy attached herewith in the appendix; motion
pending to add to record.
11.

While the Court stated that the Defendant had not appeared at the last hearing, and

that that had resulted in his issuing a warrant, as grounds for his position that he'd proceed if the
State desired to, there was no inquiry made by the Court as to the reasons and circumstances
regarding the Defendant's absence, except to ask the defense attorney where he was, to which the
defense attorney indicated she had spoken with him the Friday prior to the Monday hearing and that
he had indicated he would be at the hearing; and to aks the probation officer whether he 'd heard from
the Defendant, to which the officer said he had not. Id. at 4.
12.

Thus, no information was available nor sought-after regarding the actual reason for

the Defendant's unexplained absence. The only information was from the Defense attorney, to wit:
that he was expected to be there and had committed to come. See id.
13.

Defendant was subsequently arrested and is in fact now serving a 0-5 year term in the

custody of the Utah State Prison. R. at 112.

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Court erred in this case in proceeding with the order to show cause hearing, including
disposition thereon (imposition of the prison sentence) in absentia, based on the Court's presumption
that Defendant had waived his right to be there, without conducting, or ordering the parties and
counsel conduct, am appropriate inquiry into the reasons for the Defendant's absence. This violated
both common law precedent and Rule 22 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.

ARGUMENTS
In State v. Wanosik, 79 P.3d 937,941-945 (Utah 2003), the Utah Supreme Court set forth the
appropriate analysis for imposing sentences without the presence and the opportunity for the
Defendant himself to speak to the Court:
We do not believe that our precedent permits an automatic
presumption in favor of waiver of a constitutional right rather, we
find that the reasonable inquiry process identified by the court of
appeals is a salutary one. In State v. Houtz this court observed:
A defendant charged with a crime is entitled to be present at all stages of trial. The
right to appear and defend in person is a constitutional one, but may be waived under
certain circumstances if the defendant voluntarily absents himself from the trial.
However, that voluntariness may not be presumed by the trial court.... The trial court
made inadequate inquiry into defendant's ability to appear... before deciding that he
had waived his right to be present at trial.
714 P.2d 677, 678 (Utah 1986) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
In Wagstaff, the court of appeals stated that "[voluntariness is
determined by considering the totality of the circumstances," 772
P.2d [987 (Utah App. 1989)] at 990, a standard that clearly
contemplates some form of inquiry appropriate to the facts of the
case, as required by the court of appeals in this case. The defendant
in Wagstaff was known by the trial judge to have intentionally left
the state and failed to stay in touch with his counsel and his parole
officer, thus rendering his non-appearance at trial entirely the result
of his own misconduct. He was not, as was the defendant here,
automatically presumed to be absent voluntarily based solely on his
non-appearance at a hearing. More recently, in Anderson, this court
considered the case of a defendant who had severed contact with his
own attorney and with the prosecution. Anderson, 929 P.2d [1107
(Utah 1996] at 1110. Citing several cases involving wrongdoing or
misconduct on the part of absent defendants, the court reasoned "that
5

in some circumstances, a defendant's absence from the jurisdiction
can occasion the loss of a criminal appeal right" and "the 'defendant
must bear the consequences of his illegal acts.'" Id. at 1111 (quoting
State v. Verikokides, 925 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1996)).
The foregoing review of our precedent persuades us that the State is
incorrect in arguing that an automatic presumption of voluntariness
may be applied based on nothing more than non-appearance at a
hearing of which a defendant had notice. Instead, the question of
voluntariness is highly fact-dependent, is tied to the totality of
circumstances in particular cases, and, where there is virtually no
explanation for an absence, requires some form of inquiry by the trial
court. The prosecution, which must bear the burden of proof
regarding waiver, would be well served to assist the court in its
inquiry by providing at least some minimal evidence that the
defendant is not incarcerated. Contact with hospitals, however,
another "avenue" mentioned by the court of appeals, would seem
unwarranted unless there was some reason specific to the case (e.g.,
a defendant with a chronic illness or a history of severe disability).
Trial courts are well-positioned to assess what questions need to be
asked and answered before voluntariness can be properly inferred,
and we think the State's concern about unduly burdensome inquiries
is misplaced. In the average case, the trial court may simply instruct
defense counsel to attempt to contact the defendant or persons
familiar with the defendant to see if an explanation for the nonappearance emerges, and the prosecutor to ascertain if the defendant
is incarcerated. Should those inquiries disclose no evidence of
involuntary absence, we agree with the court of appeals that "[o]nce
inquiry appropriate to the case has been made, and a compelling
reason for the defendant's absence remains unknown, voluntariness
... may then be properly inferred." Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241 at fflf
23, 31 P.3d 615. It is true that continuances in hearings will
occasionally be required, but they need not be of long duration, and
we think fairness and constitutional procedure require them.
Alternatively, at least in sentencing hearings, a trial court might apply
a conditional presumption without a voluntariness inquiry, but
indicate on the record that the sentence will be automatically set aside
and a new hearing conducted if the defendant appears and rebuts the
presumption.
Therefore, it was inappropriate to sentence the Defendant in this case in absentia where the
Defendant had stayed in contact with his attorney, there was no evidence he had left the state, and
there was no explanation for his absence - there could have been a legitimate and justifiable excuse
or reason explaining his non-appearance.

6

The Utah Supreme Court, addition to the common law analysis set forth above, also
explained that sentencing a defendant in absentia without appropriate inquiry and findings regarding
whether there is any suitable reason for the absence, violated Rule 22 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure. The Court stated as follows:
Rule 22 states:
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the
defendant an opportunity to make a statement and to
present any information in mitigation of punishment,
or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be
imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be given
an opportunity to present any information material to
the imposition of sentence.
Utah R.Crim. P. 22(a) (emphasis added). The State contests the court
of appeals' interpretation regarding the definition of "the defendant,"
and the extent of the trial court's duty concerning "the court shall
afford ... an opportunity." . . .
Rule 22(a) codifies the common-law right of allocution, allowing a
defendant to make a statement in mitigation or explanation after
conviction but before sentencing. See State v. Maestas, 2002 UT 123,
1H[ 46, 63 P.3d 621. Historically, criminal defendants did not have the
assistance of counsel, and therefore exercised this right personally.
See generally Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 574, 81 S.Ct. 756,
5 L.Ed.2d 783 (1961). The constitutional guarantee of a right to
counsel has altered this situation, and counsel often functions as the
voice of the defendant before the court. As Justice Stewart stated, "the
defendant has a lawyer at his side who speaks fully on his behalf."
Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 306, 81 S.Ct. 653, 5 L.Ed.2d
670 (1961) (Stewart, J., concurring). While we recognize that there
are times, such as allocution, where the voice of the individual
defendant is most appropriate in the presentation of a personal plea,
State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 354-55 (Utah 1993) ("The most
persuasive counsel may not be able to speak for a defendant as the
defendant might, with halting eloquence, speak for himself."), we
have treated both voices, that of the defendant and that of counsel, as
forming one unit of the defense. . ..

7

The State argues that rule 22(a) requires only that the court
affirmatively offer an opportunity to the defendant personally to
address the court before sentencing and that defense counsel is
presumed aware of the opportunity to address the court on behalf of
his/her client. While it is true that one purpose of the right to allocute
is to provide the defendant personally with an opportunity to address
the court, another purpose is to ensure that the judge is provided with
reasonably reliable and relevant information regarding sentencing.
See State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985) ("The due
process clause of Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution,
requires that a sentencing judge act on reasonably reliable and
relevant information in exercising discretion in fixing a sentence.").
Often the specific arguments of defense counsel are critical in
ensuring the court is presented with such information and with some
context in which to consider it. Furthermore, rule 22(a) mandates that
the court afford a defendant the opportunity not only to exercise the
right to allocute, but also to present any information that might
mitigate the sentence or indicate that sentence should not be imposed.
Maestas, 2002 UT 123 at If 46, 63 P.3d 621. Since counsel acts as
the defendant's advocate, the rule therefore also requires that defense
counsel be given an opportunity to make a statementand present any
information in mitigation of punishment
Thus, affording defense
counsel the opportunity to make a statement and provide information
in mitigation of sentence ensures that a defendant is afforded the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
Wanosik's absence from the courtroom did not eliminate the need for
an opportunity to present evidence relevant to sentencing, it only
rendered irrelevant his personal right to address the court. "The right
to allocution is nowhere specifically granted in either the State or the
federal constitution. It is an inseparable part of the right to be present,
which defendant waived by his voluntary absence. The law cannot
force a right upon a defendant who turns his back upon it." State v.
Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1111 (Utah 1996). However, the
opportunity to present mitigating information relevant to sentencing
through counsel is unaffected by the defendant's personal exercise of
defendant's right to allocution. We thus find that the reference to "the
defendant" in rule 22(a) includes not only the defendant personally,
but also the defendant's counsel....
We believe that the "shall afford" language in the statute requires the
court to affirmatively provide the defense an opportunity to present
mitigating information concerning sentencing. Since rule 22 stems
from the common-law right of allocution, cases regarding the court's
8

treatment of allocution are instructive in defining the statute's terms.
The United States Supreme Court interprets language similar to the
Utah statute in the federal rules as instructing trial courts to
affirmatively provide an opportunity for mitigating information.
"[T]rial judges should leave no room for doubt that the defendant has
been issued a personal invitation to speak prior to sentencing.f' Green
v. United States, 365 U.S. 301,303 n. 1,305, 81 S.Ct. 653,5 L.Ed.2d
670 (1961) (interpreting the predecessor to the current Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure dealing with allocution, which in pertinent part
read, "[bjefore imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant
an opportunity to make a statement in his own behalf and to present
any information in mitigation of punishment."

It seems clear, from both the plain language of rule 22 and the
approach of other jurisdictions with similar rules, that the "shall
afford" language requires trial courts to affirmatively provide the
defense an opportunity to address the court and present reasonably
reliable and relevant information in the mitigation of a sentence. A
simple verbal invitation or question will suffice, but it is the court
which is responsible for raising the matter. As stated in Byars, "[t]he
defendant, himself, must be given such opportunity and some conduct
of the court must let the defendant know that he, as well as counsel,
has this right." Byars, 290 F.2d [517 (6th Cir. U.S. Ct. App. 1961] at
517 (emphasis added). Thus, we affirm the court of appeals' ruling,
and hold that both the defendant and counsel shall be affirmatively
afforded an opportunity to make a statement, present any information
in mitigation of punishment, or show any legal cause why sentence
should not be imposed; we further note that the same affirmative
obligation exists vis-a-vis the prosecution. Utah R.Crim. P. 22(a).
(some internal citations omitted).
The Court erred in this case in proceeding with the order to show cause hearing, including
disposition thereon (imposition of the prison sentence) in absentia, based on the Court's presumption
that Defendant had waived his right to be there, without conducting, or ordering the parties and
counsel conduct, an appropriate inquiry into the reasons for the Defendant's absence. This violated
both common law precedent and Rule 22 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
9

It is true the Defendant in this case had previously been found in violation of his probation
for, inter alia, failing to report to his probation officer, and that he had not been present at the first
hearing on the order to show cause. However, as to this hearing, unlike the first hearing defense
counsel indicated she had had opportunity to actually speak with the client and that he had indicated
he would be there - thus his absence was unexplained. There was no indication, nor any belief
expressed by anyone, that he had fled the state, and it was clear he had remained in contact with his
attorney.

Thus, an inquiry clearly could have, and according to the common law and the

requirements of Rule 22, must have been made before proceeding in absentia.
The Court presumed the defendant waived his right to be present, without allowing for an
inquiry into the actual reason for the absence, contrary to the Utah Supreme Court's mandated
approach for such situations, as set forth in State v. Wanosik, 79 P.3d 937 (Utah 2003)
Under Utah law, there is no automatic presumption of voluntariness based solely on the
unexplained absence of a defendant who has been notified of the date and time of sentencing. A
reasonable inquiry, appropriate to the case, must be preliminarily made before a defendant's
inexplicable absence may then be inferred to be voluntary.
Rule 22 encompasses both the defendant and his counsel, and trial courts have an
affirmative duty to provide both an opportunity to address the court and present information
relevant to sentencing before imposing sentence.

10

CONCLUSION
The disposition in this case should be vacated and the case remanded for appropriate
proceedings in accordance with the law as set forth above.
Dated this *yT"

day of

(M<~n

, 20

Randall C.Allen
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant
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Order Revoking Probation, Sentence and Order of Commitment
Transcript of September 19, 2005 Hearing
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L E O G. KANELL
Deputy Beaver County Attorney
P. O. Box 471
Beaver, Utah 84713
Telephone: (435) 438-6441
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BEAVER, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

ORDER REVOKING PROBATION,
SENTENCE AND ORDER OF
COMMITMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

:

DOUGLAS DALE JONES,
Defendant.

:

Criminal No. 041500102

:

Judge Paul D. Lyman

This matter having regularly come on for hearing before the Honorable PAUL D.
LYMAN, District Court Judge on the 19th day of September, 2005, pursuant to an Order Show Cause
dated August 29, 2005, and the Defendant not being present but represented by his attorney, ANN
MARIE MCIFF ALLEN, and Plaintiff being represented by LEO G. KANELL, Deputy Beaver
County Attorney, and the Defendant having requested this hearing and voluntarily absented himself.
The hearing was held in his absence and the State presented evidence that the Defendant violated
all of the additional terms of his probation revoked by the Court on the 9th day of May, 2005, and
executed by the Court on the 7th day of July, 2005, and the Court having determined that the
Defendant violated the terms of his probation, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, now
pnters the following Order Revoking Probation, Sentence and Order of Commitment.

ORDER REVOKING PROBATION
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Defendant's
probation previously ordered and executed the Court on September 7, 2004, is hereby ordered
revoked, based upon the rinding by the Court of the Defendant's violations of his probation as set
forth above.

SENTENCE
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the stay of
the Defendant's sentence is lifted and the Defendant, DOUGLAS DALE JONES, is hereby
sentenced to incarceration in the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term of not more than five
(5) years on the charge of CRIMINAL NONSUPPORT, a third degree felony. No fine is imposed.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant pay restitution for child support in
accordance with the records of the Office of Recovery Services.

Defendant is advised that he has thirty (30) daysfromand after September 19,2005,
to make a motion to withdraw his admission or to appeal this order and sentence or any part thereof.
Such appeal or motion shall be pursuant to the Rules of Criminal and Civil Procedure and the laws
of the State of Utah.

2

COMMITMENT
The person of said Defendant, DOUGLAS DALE JONES, is hereby committed to
the custody of the Beaver County Sheriff for the purpose of executing the foregoing Judgment and
Sentence and it is ordered that the Defendant be delivered to the Utah State Prison for the execution
of said Sentence.
DATED this

of September, 2005.
/ * - • »

-J
P A m D.LYMAN
D.LYMAN
District Court Judge

U

CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH )
: ss.
County of Beaver)
I, TRICIA BRADSHAW, Deputy Clerk of said District Court of Beaver County,
State of Utah, do hereby certify that the Honorable J. PHILIP EVES, whose name is subscribed to
the preceding certificate is the Judge of said Court, duly commissioned and qualified, and that the
signature of said Judge to said certificate is genuine.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the
Court this \ y

l

day of September, 2005.

TR4CIA BRADSHAW
/
Deputy Clerk of Fifth District Court

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR BEAVER COUNTY, STATE O F O T I H

DEC 1 2 2005
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT
BEAVER COUNTY
DEPUTY CLERK

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 041500102

VS.

DOUGLAS DALE JONES.
Defendant.

BEFORE THE HONORABLE PAUL D. LYMAN
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT
2160 South 600 West
Beaver, Utah 84713
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AND SENTENCE

SEPTEMBER 19, 2005

TRANSCRIBED BY: Russel D. Morgan

COPY
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1

September 19, 2005.

Beaver, Utah.

2|

PROCEEDINGS
THE COURT:

The state will take up the case State of

Utah vs. Douglas Jones.
identify themselves.
MR. KANELL:

Let's have everybody who is here

Mr. Kanell.
Leo Kanell for the state of Utah.

This

is David Lowry representing AP&P.
MS. ANN MARIE MCIFF-ALLEN:

Ann Marie Allen on behalf

of Mr. Jones.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Where is Mr. Jones?

MS. ANN MARIE MCIFF-ALLEN:

I spoke with him on

Friday and indicated that he needed to commit to be here or
(inaudible).

And he said, yes, he would be here.

THE COURT:

Okay.

You haven't heard from him, Mr,

Lowry, have you?
OFFICER LOWRY:
THE COURT:
hearing either.
arrest.

I have not.

Well, he didn't make it to the last

That's why I issued the warrant for his

What's the state's choice?

Do you want to proceed without him?
warrant, nobody picked him up.
voluntary promise to appear.
to do.

What do you want to do?
When I issued my last

They just let him sign a
So, you tell me what you want

If you want to proceed without him, we'll proceed

without him.

I'll conclude he's voluntarily absented himself

from the hearing.
A

1
2

MR. KANELL:

Well, we are making it sound like it's

his hearing on the warrant on the order to show cause.

3

THE COURT: Yes.

4

MR. KANELL:

Well, we are prepared to proceed.

Our

5

recommendation is the same regardless whether he's here or

6

not.

And that is, we think he should be sentenced to prison

7 I at this point.
8

THE COURT:

Okay.

Miss Allen, I assume you are not

9 1 excited about me allowing to proceed, but I think that's
10

what's appropriate in this case.

11

here.

12

for.

13
14

He's choosing not to be

This is his second hearing he's chosen not to make it

MS. ANN MARIE MCIFF-ALLEN:

Okay.

I would say that

in behalf of my client we would prefer not to proceed now.

15 I If that's the case, then we will respond.
16I

THE COURT:

I think we are going to proceed anyway.

17 1 Call your first witness.
18

MR. KANELL:

19

THE COURT:

Call Dave Lowry.
Okay.

Come forward and be sworn.
miTTn
utvj EJ
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21

called by PLAINTIFF, having been duly

22

sworn, was examined and testifies as follows

23 J
24
25

THE COURT:

Have a seat up here.

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. KANELL:
31

Q

State your name for the record.

4

A

David Allen Lowry.

5

Q

Spell your last name.

6

A

L-O-W-R-Y.

71

Q

And Mr. Jones was in court and was given some

8

additional terms that he was to comply with.

These were

9

terms that he was subject to from and after May 9th, 2005,

10

The first one was that he was to obtain a mental health

11

evaluation through a state licensed agency prior to

12 1

June 1st, 2005.

13

accomplishing that term?

Do you have any evidence of him

14 1

A

No, he has not.

15I

Q

And have you made any effort to deal with that term?

161

A

Yes, I did.

Mr. Jones had claimed that he had had a

17I

mental health evaluation and just had a copy of a class that

18

he did.

19

the lady that actually provided that evaluation.

20

informed me that it was not a full evaluation.

21

did what they called just a modified, and because they did

22

not know the reason for the evaluation.

So, I contacted the treatment provider, talked to

23 1 was more than welcome to come back in.

She
They only

She said that he
They would

24

reevaluate him with a full evaluation and even credit him

25

the money that he paid beforehand.

And Mr. Jones was

1

informed of that.

2

done,

3

Q

Okay,

But, as of this date, nothing's been

He was also told to report to AP&P in person

4

on June 1st, 2005 and also July 1st, 2005, August 1st, 2005

5

and September 1st, 2005 and also October 3rd.

6

his compliance with those requirements?

7

A

What has been

Defendant has not reported in person at all since

8

his court date.

9

occasions.

He did contact my office on a couple of

The end of May, usually early in the morning,

10

late at night when no one's there, leaving a message.

11

able to contact him, finally, on June 1st through his

12

employment.

13

think it had to be on that day.

14

the next day.

15

just never showed up.

I was

And he gave me the explanation that he didn't
So, I told him to report in

He said he would see what he could do, but

16

I was able to contact him again on the 17th.

17

in at 6 a.m., called the motel and caught him before he left

18

to work.

19

Monday and I would wait for him if he had to be late. And

20

he never showed up for June.

21

I came

Told him that he would need to report in that

For July, some phone messages were left that he was

22

seeing what he could do, but never showed up for the July.

23

did contact American Fork office, was able to get the

24

transfer approved even with the motel.

25

report to their office so they would go over his paperwork.

He just needed to

I

ll

I never could get ahold of him personally, but I left

2

messages at his motel as well as through his boss and then

3

called them back.

4|

delivered to Doug personally.

5 1 received.
6

Both of them said that the messages were
And no information was

They held the transfer until violations was filed.

Then they denied the transfer on, looks like at the end of

7 1 August, first part of September, sending it back to me.
8

Q

Any other further contact with the defendant?

9

A

Do what?

10I

Q

Have you had any further contact with him?

11

A

Yes.

12

day.

13

this Last date.

14

to teLl me that he wasn't going to be here, which was

15

already put on record.

16

find out what happened in court.

17

warrant had been issued and gave him the two options to

18

eithec turn himself in or to contact his attorney to arrange

19

a special hearing, which appears what has happened.

20

had a little discussion, as we always do.

21

no other contact's been made since then.

22

Q

The day that he was served —

thatfs not the

He was served his order to show cause to appear on

Okay.

That was verified.

He called that morning

He called me back that afternoon to
I did inform him that a

And we

Other than that,

The final additional term that was added to

23

his probation was that he pay outstanding supervisory fees.

24

Has he made any payments to you on those?

25

A

Nope.

He has not paid any of his past or current

ll

supervision fees.

There's been zero payments.

2

MR, KANELL:

3

THE COURT:

Okay.

Miss Allen?

4
5
6
7
8
9
10I
11

That's all the questions I have.

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MS. ANN MARIE MCIFF-ALLEN:
Q

Okay.

Regarding the evaluation, you said that he

got an.evaluation.
A
took.
Q

And did he submit proof of that?

All he submitted was a copy of the class that he
He never did submit what the evaluation was.
And did you discover, though, that he did in fact

take a class?

12

A

He did take a class, yes.

13 1

Q

And what was the nature of the class?

14

A

Urn, I believe it was an anger management class was

15

all.

16

Q

17

Okay.

But what you wanted him to do was to get even

a more thorough evaluation?

18

A

Yes.

19

Q

Okay.

Regarding the dates that he was supposed to

20

appear, the first one, June 1st, he didn't completely ignore

21

that, he called a couple days prior; is that right?

22

A

Yes.

23

Q

And then you —

24
25

and what was the nature of that

conversation when he called?
A

He didn't talk to me.

He just would call early in

the morning and leave messages saying, Just seeing what's
up.

Seeing what I need to do.

And then that was it.

Well,

he always says, Call me back.
Q

Okay.

So, then, was it apparent that was his effort

to attempt to comply or what?
A

Yeah, it would be his effort.

Q

Okay.

A

No.

Q

And then you spoke with him --

A

I did speak with him on June 1st.

Q

Okay.

A

He called, I believe —

But he did not in fact show up on the day?

The July 1st date, did he try to call then?
um, let's see —

he called

and just left a message.
Q

Okay.

A

That was it.

Q

And his report date was July 1st.

when your office was open?
A

Was that a day

Were you in there?

Actually, it was a Friday, um, which I normally

don't work.

But, yes, I came in and worked that day just in

case he came in.
Q

All right.

Any contact in August?

A

No.

Q

Have you had a chance to have a conversation with

No contact.

the victim, his ex-wife, about the situation?
A

I have.
1 n

1

Q

And has she expressed any desires like that she has

2

appreciated the money that's been coming in, like that's

3

been helpful to her, anything like that?

4

A

Yeah.

She's very appreciative of the money that

5

she's been receiving.

6

she knows that he's also got to comply with other things as

7

well.

8I
91
10 1
111
12 1

Q

Now, did —

A

Yes.

occasions.
Q

I have spoken with his employer on several

And they do take the checks.

Okay.

A

So, that's been going smoothly?

18

MR. KANELL:

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. KANELL:

23

Okay.

All right.

That'

all my questions.
THE COURT:

22

There's been no problem with that?

MS. ANN MARIE MCIFF-ALLEN:

17

211

She's been

Yes.

15
16

as far as you know, the garnishment has

been going as planned over the past several months?

13 1 getting the money?
14

And she's also made the comment that

Anything else, Mr. Kanell?
Nothing further.
Okay.

Thank you.

You may have a seat.

That's all the evidence that we'll

present.
THE COURT:

Miss Allen, do you want to present

anything?

24

MS. ANN MARIE MCIFF-ALLEN:

25

THE COURT:

Okay.

No.

Thank you.

Mr. Kanell, I'll hear you.

1

MR. KANELL:

This is kind of a difficult situation,

2

because he1 s just really kind of playing a game with us on

3

these little minor things that he doesn't want to comply

4

with.

And he has been paying his child support, which that's

5 1 been beneficial.

But I just don't see any other way really.

6

I don't think he'll spend much time in prison, but

7

unsupervised by a parole officer and kind of move it out of

8

our hands here.

9

complaining about us having personal biases in his case and

10 J

Won't have to be the ones talking to him and

things like that.

So, that's our recommendation.

11

THE COURT:

12

MS. ANN MARIE MCIFF-ALLEN:

13

Okay.

Miss Allen.

it is a difficult situation.

I agree with Mr. Allen,

There's very little excuse for

14 1 Mr. Jones not complying to the letter as this court directed
15

him.

I must say, however, that it is extremely beneficial

16

for his ex-wife and children to have that money.

17

punish Mr. Jones we also punish them.

18

unfortunate for them.

And when we

And that's very

19 1

In speaking with his ex-wife, she has appreciated

20 1 money.

It has been a help to her.

So, if the court does

21

sentence him to prison, that will be a hardship for her and

22

for her children.

23

Also, I wanted to raise one other concern.

When we

24

held the last hearing, of course, the court's aware I was

25

not given notice.

Had I been here, I don't know if things

1

would have gone any differently.

But I do think that it's

2

useful for a person like Mr. Jones to have someone who he

3

perceives is his ally, advise him and admonish him and help

4 J him to understand the consequences of his actions.

He is

5

the type of person, I believe, who is wary of authority and

6

may question the directives that he's given.

7

able to advise him as his ally he may have been more

8 1 compliant.
91

And were I

So I feel it's unfortunate that I was not given

notice of that hearing.

So, what I would ask on behalf of

10 1 Mr. Jones is that he be given some additional time to bring
111

himself into compliance with the order of this court.

12

THE COURT:

I need to go check the record.

13

through everything I have done today.

14

to anything that she said or not, Mr. Kanell?

15

MR. KANELL: No.

16

THE COURT:

I read

Do you want to respond

In looking at it, this is the second

17

order to show cause that we are back here on.

18

one, you were not notified.

19

I had him fill out an affidavit.

20

money.

21

for a public defender and asked him if he wanted additional

22

time or what he wanted to do.

23

to go forward.

24
25

In the last

He asked for a public defender.
He's making simply too much

At that point, I told him he wasn't going to qualify

He said he didn't.

His father was with him at the time.

He wanted

And throughout

the hearing his father actually did testify on his behalf

1

when we got to deciding what we were going to do in this

2

case.

3

I simply found that he is making too much money.

4

good job.

5

So, it wasn't as if he were without counsel, because
He's got a

What he's choosing to do is, he's choosing to live

6

in this Motel 6, which is fine if you want to do that.

7

violates probation's rules.

8

stop.

9

owned a house.

10

things.

I didn't tell him he had to

But what it does, it costs him more money than if he
And I told him it was a dumb way to do

And I think it is a stupid way to do things.
He likes to play the martyr.

11

It

12

victim.

13

case.

14

show up in person on the first of every month.

15

to the point of finding out what day of the week each first

16

of the month was for six months so that we could see if

17

there was a conflict.

18

or with me so I could say, is there going to be a problem

19

with him reporting.

20

American Fork, the purpose being to get rid of any potential

21

bias, like Mr. Kanell just brought up.

22

And he's not.

He likes to play the

He simply is not a victim in this

I made it absolutely crystal clear that he was to
We even went

And I went over each month with him,

Tell him that we transferred it to

All he had to do was show up.

If he showed up, it

23

would have been transferred.

He chose not to do that.

He

24

was told that.

25

last time to say we are not going to do -- and I punished

In other words, I did everything I could

I

1

him in no way.

2

hearing.

3

additional chances.

4

evaluation completed.

5

discussed the status of it or not.

6

completed.

I gave him no punishment at the last

I told him this was his last chance.

So, his response was he didn't get the

alleged.

9

up —

And I can't remember whether he
But it clearly wasn't

And he knows about that.

7 1 appear on those six —
8

He gets no

He simply failed to

on those three days that's been

He simply failed to appear.

He was told to call

he has to appear in person.

10

The whole point of making these guys appear in

11

person, in my mind, is to have the AP&P guy look at him and

12

do some kind of a once-over.

13

meth?

14

like he's on drugs?

15

like?

16

at 6 a.m. in the morning.

17

in the morning as an attempt to try to get out of appearing.

18

Mr. Lowry has been willing to come in on days when it wasn't

19

his day.

20

this could have been transferred to American Fork which

21

would have made it much easier, because I think this Motel 6

22

is the one somewhere near American Fork or Lehi.

23

exactly sure where it is. But it's right up there.

24

it's that one on the freeway by Lehi.

25

positive.

Is he looking like he's doing

Is he looking like he's on heroin?
You know, is he clean?

Is he looking
What's he look

And a visual is so much better than a phone message
I treat a phone message at 6 a.m.

He's been willing to arrange anything.

Okay.

And all of

I'm not
I think

But I am not

So, it's right where he works, bottom

line.
2I

And he's made no attempt to pay supervision fees.

I

3 1 do not find that he has made any effort to comply at all,
4

Now, what to do.

And as I thought about this before

5I

I came here today, having done nothing the last time and

61

simply said, all right.

7

I decided I would see what he had to say today.

Let's make sure it's crystal clear,
In my

8 J personal notes, I wrote down he ought to go to jail or
9

prison.

I don't know how much jail time I would have

10

ordered had he appeared, but something to try to get his

11

attention to let him know we are actually serious about this

12

thing.

13

the second time he's failed to appear, I have no choice in

14

my mind but to let him know that we are serious about this.

15

But when someone simply fails to appear, and this is

At this point, I am going to lift the stay on his

16

prison term.

He's no longer on probation.

I'm going to

17

issue a commitment order.

18

Prison to serve up to five years.

19

how long he's going to actually serve.

20

depend on his attitude.

21

and whether or not he hides between now and when he gets

22

picked up, I don't know for sure what he is going to do nor

23

does it matter too much at this point.

24

to comply.

25

minutes ago.

He's committed to the Utah State
I don't know, Mr. Kanell,
I imagine a lot will

When he shows up, and when he does

He simply has failed

He should have been here 40 minutes ago, 35
He's not here.

He hasn't contacted his

\

1

lawyer.

He hasn't contacted his probation officer.

2

no reason to believe that he is just willfully deciding not

3

to be here.

Consequently, prepare a commitment order he'll

4 1 go to the Utah State Prison.

He's ordered to be picked up.

5

This is a no-bail situation because I'm ordering a

6

commitment.

7

Anything else, Mr. Kanell?

8

MR. KANELL:

9

Can you put a recommendation in there

that he be given a mental health evaluation?

10

THE COURT:

You can send any letter you want up to

11

the parole board, have them take a look at it.

12

putting anything —

13

health problem.

14

an obedience problem.

15 I And that's it.
16
17

I have

I'm not

I don't know that this man has a mental

I think what he's got is what I refer to as
He just doesn't want to obey the law.

And then people like that —

MR. KANELL:

Can I put a statement in there about the

restitution?

18

THE COURT:

You can put any statement you want.

I'm

19 1 not reducing -- he's still ordered to pay everything as far
20

as fines —

not fines.

I'm not changing the fines.

21

will stay stayed.

22

stays.

23

still there.

24

am going to lift the stay.

25

And he needs to go to prison.

Fines

But with regard to restitution, that all

He still owes the money.

Every bit of everything is

I'm not going to change a bit of that.

But I

And he is no longer on probation.

Thank you very much for being here. Miss Allen
Hope it didn't cost you too much to get here.
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